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THE QUIET OF DISSOLUTION:
POST-DISASTER REDEVELOPMENT
AND STATUS-PRESERVING COMPENSATION
David V. Simunovich ∗
To add to the gloom, almost every living thing seems to have departed, and not
a whistle of a bird nor the bark of the squirrel can be heard in this solitude.
Sometimes a morose gar will throw his tail aloft and disappear in the river, but
beyond this everything is quiet—the quiet of dissolution. Down the river floats
now a neatly whitewashed hen-house, then a cluster of neatly split fence-rails,
or a door and a bloated carcass, solemnly guarded by a pair of buzzards, the
only bird to be seen, which feast on the carcass as it bears them along. A
picture-frame in which there was a cheap lithograph of a soldier on horseback,
as it floated on told of some hearth invaded by the water and despoiled of this
1
ornament.
Mark Twain, 1882
INTRODUCTION
Though written more than a century ago, Twain’s account of the
devastation wrought by that unnamed storm conveys a scene of utter
ruin and hopelessness—a scene repeated all too frequently in the
wake of major disasters. More recently, Hurricane Katrina, the costli2
3
est and third deadliest hurricane in American history, caused a
∗
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1
Mark Twain, Voyage of the Times-Democrat’s Relief Boat Through the Inundated, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES DEMOCRAT, Mar. 29, 1882, available at http://whitewolf.newcastle.edu
.au/words/authors/T/TwainMark/prose/lifeonmississippi/appendixa.html.
2
FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, HIGH WATER MARK COLLECTION FOR HURRICANE
KATRINA IN ALABAMA 6 (2006).
3
FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, SUMMARY REPORT ON BUILDING PERFORMANCE:
HURRICANE KATRINA 2005, at 1–5 (2006) [hereinafter FEMA, BUILDING
PERFORMANCE].
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sense of stillness and quietude reminiscent of Twain’s description of
the storm-ravaged Gulf Coast. However, despite Katrina’s devastation, disaster recovery itself need not be wholly disruptive to Gulf
4
Coast communities. Post-disaster redevelopment provides residents,
policy makers, and community agents with the potential to “implement technologies and practices which afford a stronger and more
5
sustainable future.” This Comment explains one method of facilitating the transition from the quiet of dissolution to the boom of effec6
tive, efficient, and equitable redevelopment.
Hurricane Katrina was “gargantuan in size,” measuring 460 miles
7
8
in diameter and registering wind speeds up to 175 miles per hour.
The intensity of the storm surge forced the Mississippi River to tem9
porarily flow backwards, flooded 148 square miles of urban land10
scape, and elevated the water level in one lake more than eleven
11
feet in nine hours. Katrina spread more than twenty-four million
tons of debris over the Louisiana landscape, submerged 350,000
12
To date,
automobiles, and damaged more than 60,000 vessels.
more than fifty-nine billion federal dollars have been committed to
13
post-Katrina redevelopment.
Most troubling, the storm took the
14
lives of approximately 1500 individuals.

4

Operation Fresh Start Recovery Assistance Programs, http://www.freshstart
.ncat.org/assist.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
5
Id.
6
While this Comment focuses on Hurricane Katrina’s effect on the Gulf Coast,
the material facts and statutory framework is relevant to any post-disaster redevelopment process.
7
DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW ORLEANS,
AND THE MISSISSIPPI GULF COAST 132 (2006).
8
Id. at 221.
9
Id. at xiii.
10
IVOR VAN HEERDEN & MIKE BRYAN, THE STORM: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY
DURING HURRICANE KATRINA—THE INSIDE STORY FROM ONE LOUISIANA SCIENTIST 109
(2006).
11
Elizabeth Kolbert, Watermark: Can Southern Louisiana Be Saved?, NEW YORKER,
Feb. 27, 2006, at 54.
12
LOUISIANA RECOVERY AUTHORITY, 2006 QUARTERLY REPORT: JUNE–AUGUST 11
(2006), available at http://www.lra.louisiana.gov/assets/quarterlyreport/LRAQuar
terlyReportAugust2006_update.pdf [hereinafter LRA, JUNE–AUG. QUARTERLY
REPORT].
13
Id. at 12.
14
Charles C. Mann, The Long, Strange Resurrection of New Orleans, FORTUNE, Aug.
21, 2006, at 86. The precise number of hurricane-related deaths is not entirely clear.
See, e.g., LRA, JUNE–AUG. QUARTERLY REPORT 2 (referring to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita as “taking nearly 1,500 lives”); FEMA, BUILDING PERFORMANCE, supra note 3, at 1–
5 (citing death toll of approximately 1,300).
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One of the neighborhoods most devastated by Katrina was the
15
16
Lower Ninth Ward. This neighborhood of 14,000 residents sits, in
some places, four feet below sea level and was flooded by eighteen
17
feet of water when the levees failed. The levee breach produced
18
“truly catastrophic results,” and sent forth a wall of water that demolished homes in its immediate vicinity, caused extensive flooding
in others, and ultimately took the lives of hundreds in less than two
19
hours.
While approximately ninety-eight percent of Lower Ninth resi20
dents were African American, Katrina’s destructive capacity did not
discriminate. “In the [Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard Parishes],
people of color represented 52% of the pre-Katrina population and
53% of the dead . . . . [T]he storm flooded 51% of the whiteoccupied homes and 67% of the black-occupied homes in the three21
parish area . . . .” While the storm destroyed without regard to race
and wealth, the burden of redevelopment will fall particularly hard
22
on the poor, which include most Lower Ninth residents.
The lasting effects of Katrina are fundamentally different than
the more transient consequences that follow minor flooding or wind
damage. Researchers analogized Katrina’s effects to the nuclear dis23
aster at Chernobyl and called for “pioneering thinking” in restoring
24
the Gulf Coast. Without such pioneering thinking—or, at a minimum, strong and sustained leadership—redevelopment is bound to
stumble along in an inefficient and inequitable manner. For example, in the absence of a program that encouraged efficient redevelopment, the city was plagued by “jack-o-lantern neighborhoods,”
where “residents are scattered among abandoned houses” through25
out the city limits. This population pattern creates a severe strain
on public services and infrastructure at a time when city services, as a

15

See Dan Baum, The Lost Year: Behind the Failure to Rebuild, NEW YORKER, Aug. 21,
2006, at 46.
16
Id.
17
VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 10, at 84.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Baum, supra note 15, at 46.
21
Mann, supra note 14, at 96.
22
See id.; see also infra notes 181–87 and accompanying text.
23
JAMES P. KAHAN ET AL., FROM FLOOD CONTROL TO INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT: LESSONS FOR THE GULF COAST FROM FLOODING IN OTHER PLACES IN THE
LAST SIXTY YEARS 39 (2006).
24
Id.
25
Mann, supra note 14, at 96.
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result of high rates of unemployment and severely reduced popula26
tion, can least afford such demands.
27
28
29
In response to the devastation, local, state, and federal officials attempted to deliver some sense of normalcy to the hurricane’s
victims by proposing or implementing various policies. One product
of these efforts is the Road Home, a program designed and implemented by state lawmakers, but funded and approved by the U.S.
30
Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Road Home
provides qualified Louisiana residents with grants of up to $150,000
31
for uncompensated storm-related damage to their homes. The plan
provides grants for home renovation and also permits qualified
homeowners to sell property to the state at a pre-disaster fair market
32
value. Homeowners also retain the right to sell property privately
33
on the open market. This federally funded program “represents the
34
largest single housing recovery program in U.S. history.”
26

Michele Krupa, Recovery Reports to Hasten Federal Cash Flow, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), Oct. 21, 2006, at 1. Krupa notes that Congress allocated more than
$10 billion to the state of Louisiana in recovery aid, yet the bulk of that money is
earmarked for the state’s housing crisis. Id. This leaves approximately $645 million
dollars for parishes to redevelop critical infrastructure, $200 million of which was
awarded to assist Entergy, a major employer and provider of public utilities, leaving
$445 million to be divided among eleven storm-damaged parishes. Id.
This lack of funding for critical infrastructure development will likely place
greater pressure on city planners to reduce the city’s footprint, i.e., concentrate redevelopment in limited areas, thereby maximizing the impact of reduced infrastructure redevelopment. This, in turn, may place greater pressure on the city to implement the buyout-only provision of the Road Home program. The criteria for this
funding restriction are left unarticulated. A major concern is that this funding
shortage will increase the pressure on Road Home administrators to cast a wider net
on the areas in which homeowners will not have the opportunity to benefit from
Road Home renovation funding.
27
See, e.g., Gary Rivlin, Storm and Crisis: Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at A11
(describing commission created by New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin).
28
See, e.g., Katrina Recovery Panel Announced, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2005, at A11
(describing creation of the Louisiana Recovery Authority by Governor Kathleen
Babineaux Blanco).
29
See, e.g., Adam Nossiter, $29 Billion Package Buoys Hopes for Rebuilding Effort, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at A11 (describing Congressman Richard Baker’s proposed
multi-billion-dollar recovery program).
30
LOUISIANA RECOVERY AUTHORITY, 2006 QUARTERLY REPORT: FEBRUARY–MAY 13–
14 (2006), available at http://lra.louisiana.gov/assets/quarterlyreport/LRAQuarterly
Report060606pdf.pdf [hereinafter LRA, FEB.–MAY QUARTERLY REPORT].
31
Id.
32
LOUISIANA RECOVERY AUTHORITY, THE ROAD HOME OVERVIEW 8 (2006), available
at http://www.lra.louisiana.gov/assets/RoadHomecomplete053006.pdf [hereinafter
LRA, ROAD HOME OVERVIEW].
33
Id.
34
LRA, JUNE–AUG. QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 12, at 9.
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The Road Home offers maximum financial assistance to home35
owners who choose to rebuild or relocate within Louisiana.
If
homeowners resided in a Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA)-designated floodplain before the storm made landfall but
36
did not carry insurance, or if they elect to move outside of the state
37
rather than rebuild in their communities, they may receive Road
38
Home assistance, but not the full $150,000 grant.
The basic contours of the Road Home are largely commendable.
It provides much-needed support to protect the homeowner status of
Katrina-displacees and at the same time provides program administrators the flexibility to concentrate redevelopment in order to
maximize the impact of a scarce resource—federal financial support.
Yet the program remains fundamentally flawed. It unnecessarily creates a cloud of confusion around the benefits and restrictions relevant to Louisiana’s most vulnerable homeowners.
A critical provision buried within the administrative innards of
the Road Home holds that residents living in areas “where a high
proportion of homeowners are choosing not to invest” in their homes
39
may not be eligible for the $150,000 rehabilitation grants. Rather,
such homeowners may sell their homes to the state at a pre-flood fair
market value, sell on the open market, or finance the renovations
40
Compounding the problem, program administrators
themselves.
never articulated the standards to be used in identifying which
41
neighborhoods, if any, would be subject to the funding restriction.

35

LRA, ROAD HOME OVERVIEW, supra note 32, at 6.
Id. at 12. “[A] 30% penalty applies to those who failed to purchase insurance
for their homes. A penalty applies to those without flood insurance in a designated
flood plain and those without hazard insurance that were outside the flood plain.”
Id.
37
Id. at 9. If a homeowner chooses to sell her home to the state, the homeowner
will receive sixty percent of the property’s pre-storm fair market value. Id.
38
Id. at 9, 12.
39
LOUISIANA RECOVERY AUTHORITY, THE ROAD HOME HOUSING PROGRAMS ACTION
PLAN AMENDMENT FOR DISASTER RECOVERY FUNDS 6–7 (2006), available at
http://www.lra.louisiana.gov/assets/roadhome/HousingActionPlanAmendment050
306.pdf [hereinafter LRA, ACTION PLAN AMENDMENT].
40
Id. at 7.
41
Id. To date, program administrators have not expressly implemented the provision. However, regardless of whether the buyout restriction is ultimately implemented, the provision’s pernicious effects were felt in the months immediately following the storm, when residents made relocation decisions. Without clearly
articulated standards, the ambiguity of who would receive benefits—aside from how
much a resident would receive—would have invariably deterred residents who lacked
the financial ability to self-finance a major home renovation (precisely the homeowners who would benefit most from government assistance). See infra Part III.C.2.
36
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The Road Home’s buyout-only restriction is, in the abstract, a
reasonable and legitimate provision in light of the fact that the popu42
lation of New Orleans dwindled to 190,000 one year after the storm,
43
less than half of its pre-storm population of 455,000. Notwithstanding the reasonableness of the provision in the abstract, the practical
effect of the restriction works an inequitable harm on displaced residents targeted by the program’s efforts to constrict the city’s size, or
its “footprint.” While the initial and perhaps most critical postKatrina redevelopment planning has passed, this issue must be confronted as natural disasters will inevitably affect communities across
44
America, and redevelopment plans will invariably follow. Plans similar to the Road Home may be common in the future, as it combines
flexibility and discretion at the administrative level with a concern for
45
the homeowner status of displacees at the beneficiary level.
This Comment asserts that Katrina-displaced homeowners are
eligible for benefits beyond the buyout-only provisions of the Road
Home under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs
46
(URA). As noted above, the buyout-only provision limits a homeowner’s options to self-financed renovation, open market sale, or a
47
state buyout at a pre-storm fair market value. The first two options
42

James Varney, Resident Count Comes in Low, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct.
6, 2006, at 1.
43
Mann, supra note 14, at 94.
44
See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 12 (2007). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a report on February 3, 2007, described as “a collaboration of hundreds of scientists and government officials, [that] was approved by 113
nations, including the United States.” Angela Charlton & Seth Borenstein, 46 Nations Back Body to Protect Planet, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 4, 2007, available at http://
www.breitbart.com/news/2007/02/04/D8N2QEGG0.html. The IPCC noted both a
trend toward stronger storm systems in the last three decades, and a likelihood that
future storm systems will grow less frequent but more severe. INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra, at 6--12.
45
It should also be noted that the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs (URA) is best
equipped to avoid repetitive losses, “[o]ne of the most serious consequences of the
National Flood Insurance Program.” RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, DISASTER AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF EXTREME NATURAL EVENTS 31 (1999). As of 1999, two percent
of insured properties consumed “over one-quarter of all [National Flood Insurance
Program] claims . . . [and forty] percent of all [National Flood Insurance Program]
payments.” Id. at 31–32. Compensation under the URA largely avoids this problem
as it permits government officials to reduce exposure to repetitive losses, while providing homeowners with a guarantee of comparable replacement housing. See infra
Part II.
46
42 U.S.C. §§ 4601–4655 (2000).
47
See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
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do not present affected low-income homeowners with reasonable alternatives. The third option is the only realistic choice that affected
low-income homeowners will have if program administrators, using
whatever metric they ultimately decide upon, designate an area as
buyout only. Moreover, homeowners who relocated in the wake of
the storm because of the ambiguity surrounding Road Home benefits
and reestablished families, employment, and affordable housing in
other areas around the country will face the same pressure to sell
property to the state under the buyback provision. Though the buyback provision does not amount to a Fifth Amendment taking, the
involuntariness of the transaction nevertheless triggers URA displacement benefits.
Part I of this Comment discusses Katrina’s impact on New Orleans generally, and the Ninth Ward particularly, as well as factors indicating that natural disasters will continue to plague the Gulf Coast.
Part II explains the statutory protections extended to displaced
persons under the URA. Part III explores three theories that advocates can utilize to ensure the application of status-preserving compensation under the URA to homeowners displaced by the Road
Home.
I.

GULF COAST SUSCEPTIBILITY TO NATURAL DISASTERS

Much has been made of the sheer strength and size of Katrina.
However, by the time it made landfall in Louisiana, it was a relatively
48
pedestrian meteorological event. The more profound and lasting
issue is the Gulf Coast’s vulnerability to even medium-sized hurricanes, caused by a confluence of disappearing wetlands, subsiding
land, and an inadequate levee system. This convergence of factors
led some scientists to characterize the Louisiana coastal region as
49
“the very definition of an inherently vulnerable landscape.”
The Louisiana coastline is distinguished by its vast network of
swamps and marshes, which account for a large portion of America’s

48

VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 10, at 85 (noting that Hurricane Katrina’s
winds were reduced to ninety-eight miles per hour—a Category Two storm—on landfall). Van Heerden and Bryan note that,
[a]s Katrina should have affected New Orleans proper, she was decidedly a medium hurricane. Sometime in the foreseeable future a bigger
storm will not take that last-minute jog to the east and every square foot
of New Orleans—all of it, not just 80 percent [as was the case with
Katrina]—will be underwater, and deeper underwater than this time.
Id. at 10.
49
Id. at 4.
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50

wetlands.
In the past, the wetlands provided a crucial buffer be51
tween Louisiana coastal communities and Gulf storm systems. However, in the last several decades, these protective wetlands disap52
peared at an alarming rate.
In addition to the disappearing wetlands, a recent study indicates that New Orleans and its levees are sinking into the Mississippi
River, with a period of drastic subsidence between the years 2002 and
53
2005. Currently, most of New Orleans is about five feet below sea
54
55
level, and the city is subsiding at a rate of one inch per year. This
rate of subsidence may seem trivial, but some levees are now three
feet lower than originally planned, substantially reducing the protec56
tion they were intended to provide. Explaining the protections ostensibly provided by the levees, one oil company executive noted that
“[i]n the offshore [oil] business . . . , we design major structures
in the Gulf for a 100-year wave height. Because that height is an
estimate, engineers add a safety factor of four to six for manned
structures—that is, they build the structure to withstand a wave
that is four to six times as high as the theoretical maximum.” . . .
By contrast, . . . the safety factor of New Orleans is 1.3. Surprised
by this low standard, [researchers] traced it back to the 1940’s
when the [Army Corps of Engineers] used a 1.3 safety factor to
protect agricultural land—cows in other words—against flood57
ing.

While a safety factor of 1.3 may seem woefully inadequate to protect
human life, when the levees were originally designed and con-

50

Id. at 153.
Mann, supra note 14, at 109; see also David Owens, Land Acquisition and Coastal
Resource Management: A Pragmatic Perspective, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 625, 625–26
(1983) (providing a concise review of the benefits of viable wetlands).
52
BRINKLEY, supra note 7, at 9. One journalist recounted the variety of comparative measurements used to convey the rate at which land is being lost on the Louisiana coastline: “The region . . . is losing land at the rate of a football field every thirty
eight minutes. Alternatively, it is said, the area is shrinking by a large desktop’s
worth of ground every second, or a tennis court’s worth every thirteen seconds, or
twenty-five square miles a year.” Kolbert, supra note 11, at 48. One estimate indicates
that an additional seven hundred square miles of coastal marshland will be lost by
2050.” BRINKLEY, supra note 7, at 9.
53
Timothy H. Dixon et al., Space Geodesy: Subsidence and Flooding in New Orleans,
NATURE, May 31, 2006, at 587.
54
VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 10, at 73.
55
Kolbert, supra note 11, at 49.
56
Id.
57
Mann, supra note 14, at 109.
51
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structed, 100 miles of marshes served as an effective buffer between
58
residential zones and Gulf storm systems.
In addition to the post-Katrina exodus of more than half the
59
city’s residents, New Orleans was suffering from a decades-long
60
population decline. The city’s footprint was more appropriate for
61
its pre-1960s population of more than 600,000. Population decline
is relevant to post-disaster recovery efforts because it is difficult, if not
62
fiscally implausible, for a “city shorn of much of its tax base” to continue to provide effective and efficient public services to residents on
63
a pre-storm population pattern.
The dramatic pace of coastal erosion and land subsidence indicate that the Louisiana coastal region will continue to be susceptible
to the devastating effects of even medium-sized hurricanes. This
need not deter redevelopment, but it should be kept in mind as policy makers at the city, state, and federal levels respond to Katrina’s
lasting effects and plan to mitigate the damage sustained in future
64
storm systems.
II. URA DISPLACEMENT BENEFITS
The express purpose of the URA is to establish “a uniform policy
for the fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced” by programs funded with federal dollars, so that displaced persons do not
“suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for
65
the benefit of the public as a whole.” The objective of the URA is to
ensure “fair, uniform, and equitable treatment” of any person dis66
placed as a direct result of a federally assisted land acquisition. Furthermore, the URA calls for consideration of “the unique circumstances” of displaced persons so that “persons in essentially similar

58

Id.
Varney, supra note 42. Nearly two years after the storm, some estimated the
New Orleans population was sixty-two percent of its pre-Katrina level. Adam Nossiter, Largely Alone, Pioneers Reclaim New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at 1. However, individual population patterns in individual neighborhoods vary significantly.
Id.
60
Baum, supra note 15, at 46.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
See Mann, supra note 14, at 96.
64
Redevelopment efforts may not be faithfully following a redevelopment plan
that seeks to mitigate the effect of future storm systems. See Peter Whoriskey, New
Orleans Repeats Mistakes as It Rebuilds, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2007, at A1.
65
42 U.S.C. § 4621(b) (2000).
66
Id. § 4621(a)(2).
59
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situations are accorded equal treatment” in administering URA bene67
The URA attempts to ensure that property owners whose
fits.
homes are acquired by a qualified state agency “receive the replace68
ment value—rather than the market value—of their property.”
The URA regulations provide for three tranches of benefits.
Benefits enumerated in Subpart B are triggered if property is con69
veyed involuntarily.
Subpart B benefits include, inter alia, a home70
owner’s right to an expeditious acquisition of his property, advance
71
notice of an agency’s intent to acquire property, offers of “just com72
73
pensation,” and certain litigation expenses. The benefits enumerated in Subparts D and E are triggered if the property owner is con74
sidered a “displaced person.”
Subpart E provides that an owner75
occupant displaced by a qualified state agency may receive a pay76
The rement of up to $22,500 to acquire replacement housing.
placement housing must be “a decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling . . .
77
reasonably accessible to public services and places of employment,”
78
functionally equivalent to the acquired property, adequate in size to
79
accommodate the occupants, in an area that is “not subject to un80
reasonable environmental conditions,” and within the financial

67

Id. § 4621(c)(2).
Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105
MICH. L. REV. 101, 121 (2006).
69
49 C.F.R. § 24.101(a), (b) (2006).
70
Id. § 24.102(a).
71
Id. § 24.102(b).
72
Id. § 24.102(d)–(g).
73
§ 24.107.
74
§ 24.202 (describing applicability of Subpart C to “displaced persons”); §
24.301 (describing applicability of Subpart D moving expenses to “displaced persons”).
75
§ 24.2(a)(1)(iv) (2006). “The term State Agency means any department,
Agency or instrumentality of a State or of a political subdivision of a State, any department, Agency, or instrumentality, of two or more States or of two or more political subdivisions of a State or States, and any person who has the authority to acquire
land by eminent domain.” Id.
76
42 U.S.C. § 4623(a)(1); see also 49 C.F.R. § 24.401.
77
§ 4623(a)(1)(A).
78
49 C.F.R. § 24.2(a)(6)(ii). Functional equivalency “means that it performs the
same function, and provides the same utility. . . . [T]he principle features [of the
displacement dwelling] must be present. Generally, functional equivalency is an objective standard, reflecting the range of purposes for which the various physical features of a dwelling may be used.” Id.
79
Id. § 24.2(a)(6)(iii).
80
Id. § 24.2(a)(6)(iv).
68
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81

means of the displaced person. Additionally, under Subpart E, acquiring agencies are permitted to provide financial assistance beyond
the statutory maximum on a case-by-case basis if the $22,500 amount
proves inadequate for the acquisition of comparable replacement
82
housing. Under Subpart D, displaced homeowners are also entitled
83
to compensation for actual moving expenses, mortgage and closing
84
85
costs, security deposits and credit checks, living expenses between
86
the taking and acquisition of replacement housing, and litigation
expenses if the government unsuccessfully attempts to acquire a par87
ticular piece of property through condemnation proceedings.
While the URA provides significant financial assistance to displaced
88
homeowners, it also preserves a modicum of flexibility for city planners. For example, the comparable replacement dwelling is not re89
quired to be in the same neighborhood as the acquired property,
and the replacement dwelling need not contain “every feature of the
90
displacement dwelling.”
As noted above, Subparts D and E are triggered if a property
owner is considered to be a “displaced person.” The statutory and
regulatory definitions of “displaced person” have proven to be fluid
concepts. As originally envisioned in 1971, a displaced person was
81

Id. § 24.2(a)(6)(viii). Replacement housing is “considered to be within the
homeowner’s financial means if the homeowner will receive the full price differential
. . . , all increased mortgage interest costs . . . and all incidental expenses . . . .” Id. §
24.2(a)(6)(viii)(A). Similar provisions qualify the affordability of replacement housing for displaced renters. Id. § 24.2(a)(6)(viii)(B).
82
42 U.S.C. § 4626(a); see also 49 C.F.R. § 24.404 (2006). Evidence suggests super-compensation, i.e., compensation above the statutory maximum, is not unheard
of, and may be used both to ensure replacement housing as well as to overcome
popular disapproval of takings projects. Garnett, supra note 68, at 122–23.
83
42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(1).
84
Id. Also, businesses are entitled to reestablishment compensation. § 4622(c).
Renters also receive significant protection under the URA, and may receive, among
other things, up to sixty times the amount of the difference between their predisplacement and post-displacement rental costs. 24 C.F.R. § 42.350(e)(1) (2006);
see also Garnett, supra note 68, at 122–23.
85
24 C.F.R. § 42.350(c).
86
Id. § 42.350(d).
87
42 U.S.C. § 4654(a).
88
This Comment does not argue that displacement assistance will fully compensate homeowners who lose their home to a state agency. Indeed, full compensation
for state acquisition of property from an unwilling seller may be impossible. See generally Rachel Godsil & David Simunovich, Just Compensation in an Ownership Society, in
PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND EMINENT DOMAIN (Robin Paul
Malloy ed., forthcoming 2008).
89
Mejia v. HUD, 518 F. Supp. 935, 938 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
90
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Regulations for
Federal and Federally Assisted Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 8912, 8945 (Mar. 2, 1989).
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defined broadly as “any person who . . . moves from real property . . .
as a result of the acquisition of such property” by a federally funded
91
program. In passing the Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of
1987 (“1987 Amendments”), Congress refined the conceptual frame92
work of a displaced person to include a “direct result” element.
Consequently, only those residents displaced from their property as a
“direct result . . . of the acquisition of such property” by a federally
funded program would be considered statutorily protected displaced
93
persons.
The 1987 Amendments also incorporated a provision to further
clarify the scope and application of the URA by noting who was not a
94
displaced person. These negative definitions expressly preclude a
resident who unlawfully occupies a home from enjoying URA dis95
Additionally, individuals who reside on the
placement benefits.
96
property for the purpose of obtaining URA benefits, as well as shortterm renters whose period of tenancy expires before the property is
needed by the acquiring agency, are similarly precluded from enjoy97
ing URA benefits as they are “persons not displaced.”
Following the change in statutory language, the Federal Highway
Administration (FHA) revised the URA regulatory framework in
98
1989.
These regulations expounded upon the displaced person
standard and incorporated the direct result element for the acquisi99
100
tion, rehabilitation, or demolition of real property.
Additionally,
101
a non-exclusive listing of persons not displaced was included.

91

Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs, 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976).
92
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs, 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(A)(i)(I) (1988).
93
Id.
94
§ 4601(6)(B).
95
§ 4601(6)(B)(i).
96
Id.
97
§ 4601(6)(B)(ii).
98
The Department of Transportation was given the responsibility of promulgating regulations for the implementation of the URA, and the Secretary of Transportation delegated that responsibility to the Federal Highway Administration. Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Regulations for Federal and
Federally Assisted Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 8912, 8912 (Mar. 2, 1989). These regulations apply to “acquisition and displacement activities of 18 Federal Agencies.” Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and FederallyAssisted Programs, 70 Fed. Reg. 590, 590 (Jan. 4, 2005).
99
49 C.F.R. § 24.2(g)(1)(i) (1989).
100
Id. § 24.2(g)(1)(ii).
101
Id. § 24.2(g)(2).
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These regulations were consistent with the statutory changes made by
102
the 1987 Amendments.
The revised regulations preclude mandatory benefits under
Subpart B if an “owner-occupant . . . voluntarily conveys his or her
103
property, as described in § 24.101(a)(1) and (2).”
Section
24.101(a)(1) describes a voluntary conveyance as one in which “no
104
specific site or property needs to be acquired,” the property in
question “is not part of an intended, planned, or designated project
105
area,” and it will not be acquired if the owner-occupant and the ac106
quiring agency fail to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. The
acquiring agency must also relate to the owner “what it believes to be
107
the fair market value of the property.” For a transaction to be con108
In
sidered “voluntary,” each of the four criteria must be satisfied.
addition, section 24.101(a)(2) provides that displacement benefits
are not to be extended if the acquiring agency is not vested with the
109
This facially unequivocal
authority to exercise eminent domain.
language could be interpreted to preclude a cause of action for displacement benefits for Katrina-displacees because the Road Home is
not vested with the power of eminent domain.
Before proceeding, it is important to reinforce the fact that the
voluntariness of a certain transaction governs Subpart B benefits
110
only.
Benefits under Subparts D and E are triggered only if the
111
homeowner is a “displaced person” under the URA. There is, without doubt, a large degree of overlap between the triggering events;
but the standards are nevertheless different. Katrina displacees
should be considered “displaced persons” if they moved as a “direct

102

Compare § 24.2(g)(2) with Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs, 42 U.S.C. §
4601(6)(A) (1988).
103
§ 24.2(g)(2)(viii).
104
Id. § 24.101(a)(1)(i).
105
Id. § 24.101(a)(1)(ii).
106
Id. § 24.101(a)(1)(iii).
107
Id. § 24.101(a)(1)(iv).
108
Id. § 24.101(a)(1).
109
49 C.F.R. § 24.101(a)(2) (1989). Subpart B benefits will not be extended under this provision so long as the acquiring agency “clearly advise[s] the owner that it
is unable to acquire the property” through eminent domain proceedings should the
parties fail to come to an agreement. Id. § 24.101(a)(2)(i). Additionally, the owner
must be informed as to what the acquiring agency believes is the “fair market value of
the property.” Id. § 24.101(a)(2)(ii).
110
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
111
49 C.F.R. § 24.301(a) (2006); Id. § 24.401(a).

SIMUNOVICH_FINAL

344

1/14/2008 9:01:25 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:331
112

result of . . . the acquisition” of their homes by the Road Home. As
explained in Part III, homeowners who relocated because of Katrina
113
Their
will be protected under a theory of constructive occupancy.
114
displacement was prolonged by the Road Home, and once their
property is formally acquired by the program, the displaced homeowners will be eligible for benefits under Subparts D and E.
Three arguments can be made to rebut the apparent prerequisite for eminent domain power to trigger Subpart B benefits. First,
section 24.101, while facially unequivocal, is in reality more nuanced
and reflects the underlying regulatory and legislative framework
115
within which displacement arises. Second, section 24.101 is without
the weight of law because it impermissibly narrows the scope and application of the URA. Third, the buyout-only provision amounts to
an involuntary conveyance of property under the URA, thereby satisfying even the narrowest interpretation of the scope of section 24.101
under a theory of “functional takings.”
III. THEORIES OF RECOVERY UNDER THE URA
A. The Regulations are More Nuanced Than Their Facially
Unequivocal Language
That the Road Home is not vested with the power of eminent
domain does not preclude Katrina-displacees from successfully pursuing Subpart B benefits, despite the ostensibly unambiguous language
of section 24.101. As noted above, section 24.101(a)(2) expressly
precludes URA benefits if the acquiring agency does not have the
116
power of eminent domain.
However, in explicating the scope of
section 24.101, the FHA noted that “[e]minent domain authority is
117
Moreover, the 1987 Amendnot a determining factor by itself.”
ments were described as expanding the scope of the URA “to include
any private entity that has the power of eminent domain under Fed-

112

42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(A)(i)(I).
See infra Part III.C.1.
114
See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
115
This inquiry, of course, assumes that property acquired by the Road Home
would fulfill each of the four tests contemplated by § 24.101(a)(1)(i–iv). However, it
is likely that Road Home acquisitions would fail the second test, as acquired property
would likely considered part of an “intended, planned, or designated project area.”
§ 24.101(a)(1)(ii).
116
Id. § 24.101(b)(2).
117
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Regulations for
Federal and Federally Assisted Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 8912, 8918 (Mar. 2, 1989).
113
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118

eral or state law.”
The use of federal dollars to finance property
acquisition—not the eminent domain power—“is the basic determi119
Moreover, section 24.101 is motinant for [URA] applicability.”
vated by an administrative intent to differentiate between voluntary,
arm’s-length
transactions
between
government-buyers
and
120
and federally funded involuntary conveyhomeowner-sellers,
121
ances.
Moreover, the URA’s preference for substance over
form(and the emphasis on involuntariness, rather than the presence
or absence of eminent domain authority) was recognized by the FHA
itself when it noted that “[t]he essence of a voluntary transaction is
the conditions surrounding the transaction, not the type of transac122
tion itself.”
Considering the statutory and administrative intent, it is apparent that the regulations are more nuanced than they initially appear.
Understood in its proper context, the reference to eminent domain
power is nothing more than a useful short-hand approach—but ultimately not a dispositive element—in assessing whether an acquiring
agency must provide Subpart B benefits.
The FHA revised the URA regulations in 2005, and it is only with
the proper understanding of the 1987 Amendments and their corresponding regulations that the more recent regulations can be placed
in appropriate context and accorded the correct interpretation. Notably, the 2005 revisions amended the regulatory framework in the
absence of any change to the relevant statutory language of the
123
URA.
The definition of displaced person, redesignated in 2005 as section 24.2(a)(9), remained substantively equivalent to its 1989 coun124
terpart.
The definition of persons not displaced is also left largely,
118

Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 18768, 18769 (May
19, 1987).
119
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Regulations for
Federal and Federally Assisted Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. at 8918. The Federal Register
goes on to explain that “any acquisition made under the threat of eminent domain is
clearly subject to [the URA].” Id.
120
The government-buyer includes qualified state agencies, which encompasses
agencies created by the state as well as individuals vested with the power of eminent
domain. 49 C.F.R. § 24.3(a)(1)(iv) (2006).
121
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and
Federally-Assisted Programs, 70 Fed. Reg. 590, 596 (Jan. 4, 2005).
122
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Regulation for
Federal and Federally Assisted Programs, 52 Fed. Reg. 47994, 48011 (Dec. 17, 1987).
123
Compare 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4601–4655 (2003 & Supp. 2007) with 42 U.S.C. §§
4601–4655 (1988).
124
Compare 49 C.F.R. § 24.2(a)(9)(i) (2005) with 49 C.F.R. § 24.2(g)(1)(i) (1989).

SIMUNOVICH_FINAL

346

1/14/2008 9:01:25 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:331

125

but not entirely, unchanged.
Most relevant for purposes of this
Comment, the 2005 regulatory definition of displaced person omitted reference to “voluntary” conveyances as defined in section
126
In the 1989 regulations, the definition of “persons not dis24.101.
placed” included an “owner-occupant who voluntarily convey[s] his
or her property” to the acquiring agency as described in section
127
However, the 2005 revisions omit the “voluntary” lan24.101.
guage—providing instead that displacement benefits should not be
extended to “[a]n owner-occupant who conveys his or her property”
to the acquiring agency in a transaction described in section
128
The purpose of omitting the “voluntary” language in the
24.101.
129
The omis2005 revisions is not explained in the Federal Register.
sion appears to reflect a change in section 24.101, which in its 2005
manifestation does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary
130
direct acquisitions by federal programs (as opposed to state programs
funded by federal dollars). URA applicability to federally funded
state programs, as described in section 24.101(b), remains exactly the
131
As a result, acquisisame as the corresponding 1989 regulations.
tions made by the Road Home—a federally funded state program—
132
would still be evaluated by the voluntariness principle.
Despite the facially unequivocal language of the regulation,
eminent domain power is only indicative, and not dispositive, of a
URA triggering event. The statutory language and the regulatory
framework pertaining to federally financed state acquisitions remained virtually unchanged in the 2005 regulatory revisions. As a result, the goal of providing equitable treatment to displaced homeowners who involuntarily convey property to an acquiring agency
remains the linchpin Subpart B benefits. Consequently, Katrina125

One substantial change is the preclusion of URA benefits for “[a] person who
is not lawfully present in the United States.” 49 C.F.R. § 24.2(a)(9)(ii)(L) (2005).
126
Id. § 24.2(a)(9)(ii)(H).
127
49 C.F.R. § 24.2(g)(2)(viii) (1989).
128
49 C.F.R. § 24.2(a)(9)(ii)(H) (2005).
129
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and
Federally-Assisted Programs, 70 Fed. Reg. 590, 590–606 (Jan. 4, 2005).
130
§ 24.101(a)(1). Even this facially unequivocal language is tempered by Appendix A, which states that, despite the language of section 24.101, direct federal acquisitions that are voluntary in nature will not trigger the URA if the acquiring
agency does not have “recourse to the power of eminent domain.” Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and Federally-Assisted Programs, 70 Fed. Reg. at 595–96. Thus, the voluntariness principle applies to both the
direct federal acquisitions and acquisitions by federally funded programs.
131
Compare § 24.101(b) (2005) with § 24.101(a)(1) (1989).
132
See 49 C.F.R. § 24.101(b) (2005).
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displacees are not precluded from receiving URA displacement benefits simply because the Road Home is not vested with the power of
eminent domain.
B. A Narrowly Construed Eminent Domain Provision Manifestly
Contradicts the Unambiguous Intent of the URA
If the reference to eminent domain is interpreted narrowly—
that is, if it is interpreted to require the presence of the eminent domain power to trigger Subpart B benefits—it would impermissibly
narrow the scope and application of the URA and would consequently be without the weight of law. Assuming a reviewing court determines that Congress did not clearly express its intent to apply the
voluntariness test, the FHA’s regulations would be examined for rea133
sonableness.
Congress expressly authorized the FHA to promulgate regula134
tions to administer the URA.
These regulations are entitled to
“controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
135
contrary” to the statute. Regulations do not carry the force of law if
they are irreconcilable with the “clear meaning of the statute, as re136
While “considerable
vealed by its language, purpose, and history.”
weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction
137
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer,” deference to an
agency’s policy expertise does not merit granting carte blanche authority to promulgate regulations that contradict congressional intent.
Under Chevron, courts first ask whether there is clear congressional intent respecting the issue at hand, and if not, whether the
138
agency’s interpretation of the underlying statute is reasonable.
As
discussed below, the statutory scheme and legislative history of the
URA clearly and unequivocally expresses congressional intent to
avoid any mechanistic, dispositive eminent domain requirement.

133

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
134
42 U.S.C. § 4604(b)(1) (2000).
135
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (requiring reversal of
agency action determined by a court to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
136
Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979); see also Finkler v. Elsinore
Shore Assocs., 781 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (D.N.J. 1992).
137
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
138
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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The 1987 Amendments significantly expounded upon the ex139
press declaration of policy accompanying the URA.
As amended,
the statute calls for “fair, uniform, and equitable treatment of all af140
fected persons,” and reaffirms a specific commitment to improving
141
the “housing conditions of economically disadvantaged persons.”
In explaining the language behind the amended language, Senator
David Durenberger, a co-sponsor of the 1987 Amendments, explained that the declaration of policy establishes that a URA trigger142
ing event can arise outside of traditional property acquisitions.
Moreover, it was intended that “uniformity should be subordinate to
143
the need for flexibility in administering the URA.”
In addition to
promoting principles of administrative flexibility, the 1987 Amendments were designed to “broaden the applicability of the act to include persons not . . . eligible for assistance” under the 1971 provi144
The Federal Register is replete with statements by the FHA
sions.
recognizing the URA’s mandate for flexibility over uniformity, and
fact-intensive inquiries into voluntariness rather than a cursory emi145
nent domain litmus test.
The enumeration of federal and state agencies required to comply with the URA (“covered entities”) was also amended in 1987. Specifically, the 1987 Amendments amended the definition of covered
146
entities to include those vested with the power of eminent domain.
The fact that the eminent domain provision was added to the list of
covered entities is significant. Proposed versions of the amended language—which were never passed by Congress—called for replacing
the description of covered entities with a simple, but markedly less
flexible, definition of a covered entity to include only those entities

139

Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (2000) with 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 4621(a)(2) (2000).
141
Id. § 4621(c)(3). See also 133 CONG. REC. S1560 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1987) (statement of Sen. Durenberger) (“Of particular concern to the committee are those economically disadvantaged who are least able to afford suitable replacement housing
and who are involuntarily displaced.”).
142
See Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1985, S. 249, 99th Cong., as reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. S495 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1985).
143
Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 98-71 (1983), as reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. S1560 (daily
ed. Feb. 3, 1987) (“The committee’s revisions are largely intended to establish the
conditions under which regulatory flexibility is preferable to uniformity.”).
144
S. REP. NO. 98-71 (1983), as reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. S1560 (daily ed. Feb. 3,
1987).
145
See supra Part III.A.
146
42 U.S.C. § 4601(1), (3).
140
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vested with the power of eminent domain.
In adopting the more
flexible language, Congress rejected the notion that URA benefits
could be triggered only by an entity vested with the power of eminent
domain. Moreover, in a report on the proposed amendments, the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs explained that “acquisition of property under eminent domain, or the threat thereof, is not
the only cause of the permanent and involuntary displacement of a
148
person.”
If the eminent domain provision in the 1989 regulations is interpreted narrowly—as dispositive rather than merely probative—
then the statutory framework and legislative history outlined above
demonstrates that the narrowed interpretation manifestly contradicts
clear and unambiguous congressional intent and should not be ac149
corded the weight of law.
Despite unambiguous statutory lan150
151
guage, and contrary to legislative intent, the regulatory eminent
domain provision improperly exalts uniformity over Congress’s express desire for administrative flexibility. As described above, the
1987 Amendments were intended to broaden the class of people protected by the URA, and it was expressly noted that displacement
benefits could be triggered absent the exercise of the eminent domain
152
If interpreted narrowly, however, the regulations promulpower.
gated in 1989 would significantly curtail URA benefits so as to apply
only to the exceptional class of displaced residents who are forced to
relocate because of traditional eminent domain takings. Consequently, the putative regulatory requirement of eminent domain authority to trigger Subpart B benefits should not be accorded the
weight of law since the regulations manifestly contradict the statutory
framework and legislative intent informing the URA.

147

Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1985, S. 249, 99th Cong., as reprinted
in 131 CONG. REC. S10669 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985).
148
S. REP. NO. 98-71 (1983), as reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. S1561 (daily ed. Feb. 3,
1987).
149
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
150
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4621(a)(1) (recognizing that a person may be displaced by
a number of activities, only one of which is acquisition).
151
See supra notes 117–22, 142–48 and accompanying text.
152
See supra notes 117, 119, 122, 148, and accompanying text.
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C. Assuming a Narrow Construction of the Eminent Domain
Provision, the Buyout-Only Provision is a URA Triggering Event
Under a Theory of Functional Takings
Under a narrow interpretation of the eminent domain provision,
and assuming the regulations are accorded the weight of law, the
Road Home buyout-only provision nevertheless triggers URA displacement benefits. The buyout-only provision amounts to a “functional taking” of property under the URA. There are two hurdles
that a viable cause of action under the URA must clear on its way to
judicial recognition under this approach: the policy of constructive
153
occupancy, and the theory of “functional takings.”
1.

Constructive Occupancy

The URA mandates that a displaced person occupy the acquired
residence for 180 days prior to acquisition to be eligible for reloca154
tion benefits.
This threshold requirement would preclude URA
benefits where an individual lives in one home, and a qualified
153

It should be noted as an initial matter that the theory of “functional takings” as
applied in this Comment does not assume the same scope as it would in the eminent
domain context. The standard for a URA-triggering event is not an eminent domain
taking but is instead reviewed for a more flexible, equitable standard of voluntariness. It is in this context that “functional taking” as used in this Comment should be
interpreted. The term should not be confused with the scholarly use of the term as a
reference to certain regulatory takings. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and
Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 304 (1992) (describing “regulations that
are functionally equivalent to government acquisitions” as takings); Christopher L.
Harris & Daniel J. Lowenberg, Recent Developments: Kelo v. City of New London, Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, and Washoe County v. United
States: A Fifth Amendment Primer, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 669, 687 (2005) (referring to “the
functional equivalent to a physical taking” in describing the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)); Barbara White, Coase and
the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IOWA L. REV. 577 (1987) (describing the
application of the Coase Theorem as resulting in a “functional equivalent of taking
of private property without compensation” in certain instances).
Furthermore, functional takings for purposes of the URA is substantively different
than a constructive taking in the eminent domain context, although similar arguments can be made for both doctrines. Constructive takings arise when a condemning authority engages in a course of unconstitutional conduct intended to force
homeowners to sell property to the government at depressed values. See, e.g., Amen
v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789, 794–96 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that city government engaged in conduct amounting to a constructive taking of property when the
city, inter alia, manipulated permits to limit homeowner renovations, indicated compensation would be reduced the longer homeowners waited to sell their property,
and repeatedly informed the residents that their property was subject to condemnation). A functional taking for purposes of the URA need not meet the more rigid
requirements of eminent domain takings; rather, it must only be evident that the
conveyance was not voluntary. See supra Part II.
154
42 U.S.C. § 4623(a)(1).

SIMUNOVICH_FINAL

2008]

1/14/2008 9:01:25 AM

COMMENT

351

agency acquires a property upon which the individual was constructing a second home with the intention that it would ultimately be his
155
Alternatively, URA benefits would not be trigprimary residence.
gered if an individual’s completed second home is involuntarily conveyed to an acquiring agency if the acquired home is not intended to
156
be a primary residence.
The plain language of the 180-day requirement might appear to
preclude the recovery of URA benefits by Katrina displacees. The argument would likely be made that (1) Road Home displacement
benefits are unwarranted in cases where property owners did not occupy their homes for the required 180-day period prior to acquisition, and (2) even if the 180-day requirement is satisfied or overlooked, it was a natural disaster, not a federally financed acquisition,
that forced residents out of their homes. Neither contention holds
water.
State and federal acquiring agencies argued the validity of the
157
constructive occupancy policy before a number of courts, despite
the fact that it is not codified in any provision of the URA or its regu158
The doctrine was first recognized in Seeherman v. Lynn, a
lations.
case in which residents of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania were displaced
by Hurricane Agnes and whose properties were subsequently ac159
In Seeherquired by a federally funded redevelopment authority.
man, the court found that the theory of constructive occupancy “provided that all owners of property . . . who occupied their homes on
the day prior to [a natural disaster] would be eligible to receive relo160
cation assistance.”
The origin of the constructive occupancy policy is unclear but
has not been refuted since Seeherman was decided in 1975. The Seeherman court noted that the policy may be attributable to the Disaster
Relief Act of 1970, mandating that relocation benefits may not be
155

Seeherman v. Lynn, 404 F. Supp. 1318, 1319–20 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
See Ledesma v. Urban Renewal Agency, 432 F. Supp. 564, 565–67 (S.D. Tex.
1977) (by implication). The court in Ledesma also found it relevant that the homeowners in question, who were deemed to have a case strong enough to survive the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, were forced to live in a second home because of economic hardship. Id. at 565. Consequently, the court found that under
the policy of constructive occupancy, the homeowners were not precluded from receiving displacement benefits under the URA even though they were not residing in
the acquired home at the time of acquisition. Id. at 567.
157
See generally Nagi v. United States, 751 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir. 1985); Ledesma,
432 F. Supp. at 567; Seeherman, 404 F. Supp. at 1321–22.
158
Seeherman, 404 F. Supp. at 1320 n.1.
159
Id. at 1319–20.
160
Id. at 1320.
156
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withheld if an otherwise eligible homeowner is denied benefits because she was prevented from reestablishing occupancy due to a pre161
sidentially declared disaster. The court offered this perspective despite the fact that the provision in question applied only to the URA’s
162
predecessor, not to the URA itself. Two years after Seeherman, a district court in Ledesma v. Urban Renewal Agency offered a more persua163
sive analysis of the origin of the constructive occupancy policy. The
court presumed that the policy originated with the URA’s requirement that residents displaced by a federally funded program receive
164
The court relied on information in
fair and equitable treatment.
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD)
Relocation Handbook, which articulated the constructive occupancy
policy as a means of mitigating what might otherwise be inequitable
results from the strict application of the URA’s statutory and regula165
tory provisions.
2.

Actual Displacement Through Functional Takings

The second and admittedly more complicated hurdle to judicial
recognition of a URA-based cause of action is the theory of “functional takings.” As explained above, Road Home rehabilitation funding is not available to residents residing “in an area where a high
proportion of homeowners are choosing not to invest” in their
166
homes.
City officials publicly claimed that no communities would
be targeted for planned elimination; however, the choice may yet be
forced on them as funding shortages continue to plague redevelop167
ment efforts. Moreover, the provision’s pernicious effects were felt
in the months immediately following the storm, and will have the
same effect on economically disadvantaged homeowners regardless of
168
whether the buyout-only restriction is actually implemented.
The “functional takings” theory is based on the principle that
“[a]cceptance of decision-making power requires acceptance of the

161

Id. at 1322 n.5 (citing Disaster Relief Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4484 (1970)).
Id.
163
Ledesma v. Urban Renewal Agency, 432 F. Supp. 564, 567 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
164
Id.
165
Id. at 567 n.1.
166
LRA, ACTION PLAN AMENDMENT, supra note 39, at 6–7.
167
Nossiter, supra note 59, at 1 (describing funding shortages in the Road Home
as well as a complete absence of funding for the city’s own billion-dollar redevelopment plan).
168
See supra note 41.
162
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responsibility for the predictable effects of that power.”
The displacement of New Orleans residents is both a planned and predict170
able effect of the Road Home buyout-only provision. The program
provides homeowners with a means of selling property to the state so
the property owner can move out of a neighborhood or the state entirely. Additionally, the ambiguities surrounding the administration
171
of the Road Home serve to reinforce displacement. A Rand Corpo172
ration study, conducted in response to Gulf Coast redevelopment,
explained that
[i]ndividual and collective decisions about how to proceed with
reconstruction in the affected areas of the Gulf Coast are interconnected in complex ways, sometimes referred to in shorthand
as the “chicken and egg” problem. Uncertainty about the future
level of protection will temper or tip investments and the rebuild/relocate decisions that ultimately shape the scope of recon173
struction.

Thus, the uncertainty about the potential benefits extended to returning homeowners in the months following Katrina created a disincentive to return and invest financial resources and sweat equity in
174
In turn, this disincentive comrebuilding storm-damaged homes.
pounded the uncertainty besetting residents and policy makers in determining which communities could ultimately thrive in post-Katrina
175
Indeed, no greater uncertainty could exist than the
New Orleans.
combination of the Road Home’s cryptic admission that it had not
determined how to identify neighborhoods where too few homeown-

169

Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Displacement and Urban Reinvestment: A Mount Laurel Perspective, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 333, 362 (1984).
170
Id.
171
Nossiter, supra note 59, at 1 (noting that as of July 1, 2007—nearly two years
after Katrina made landfall—only twenty percent of eligible homeowners who applied for Road Home funding received checks).
172
Rand Corporation, http://www.rand.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2007). “The
Rand Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis.” Id. at http://www.rand.org/about/.
173
KAHAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 39.
174
Nossiter, supra note 59, at 1.
175
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that homeowners who have returned must
navigate through a cripplingly slow bureaucracy in order to receive the promised recovery assistance. James Varney, What a Drag, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct.
27, 2006, at 1. Displaced residents who visited the Orleans Parish Mortgage Conveyance Office for necessary paperwork found that they needed to wait two days to
speak with a representative. Id. The problem facing the residents, and the conveyance office, is largely one of supply and demand. The supply of experienced employees has dwindled, yet the demand for the services has grown exponentially. Id.
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ers were choosing to reinvest and its cripplingly slow delivery of federal funding.
Areas in which “too few homeowners are choosing” to reinvest
will likely be the areas where residents have the least disposable income to devote to post-storm rehabilitation and were least able to af176
ford homeowners insurance prior to the flooding.
In a 1979 report, HUD recognized that the effects of displacement are
177
Thus, it is
particularly disruptive to families with lower incomes.
necessary to consider the socioeconomic status of the displaced resi178
dents.
Based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the residents of the
Lower Ninth Ward can undoubtedly be characterized as a “socially
179
vulnerable population.” Nearly ninety percent of the population is
African American and more than one-third of the residents do not
180
have a high school degree. The median household income in 1999
181
was less than half of the national average, median family income
182
was sixty percent lower than the national average, and nearly four

176

Salsich, Jr., supra note 169, at 335 n.8.
Displacement disproportionately affects socially vulnerable populations: minorities, low-income households, female-headed households
and renters. Each of these groups has particular attributes that contribute substantially to the inability of displaced persons to find housing under the “filtering” concept. First, minorities often are barred
from access to many submarkets through discrimination. Low income
households are limited to certain markets purely by cost. Femaleheaded households are almost low-income by definition; 33% of them
fall below the poverty line. A report of the United States Commission
on Civil Rights states that in 1981 the poverty rate for persons in black,
female-headed households was 68%.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Indeed, nearly two years after the storm, New Orleans’s poorest neighborhoods remain largely abandoned. Nossiter, supra note 59, at
1.
177
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., DISPLACEMENT REPORT 24 (1979).
178
Salsich, Jr., supra note 169, at 335 n.9 (“The impact of any forced move is correlative to income levels.”)
179
Id. at 335 n.8.
180
U.S. Census Bureau, Zip Code Tabulation Area 70117, http://factfinder.
census.gov (enter zip code “70112” under “Get a fact sheet for your community”).
The percentage of Ninth Ward residents with high school degrees is 61.7%, while the
national average is more than eighty percent. Id.
181
Id. The median income of Ninth Ward residents is $19,567 and the national
average is $41,994. Id. This is also one third lower than the median income of Louisiana residents, which was $32,566 in 2000. U.S. Census Bureau, Louisiana Census
2000 Demographic Profile Highlights, http://factfinder.census.gov (select “Louisiana” under “Get a fact sheet for your community”; click the “2000” tab).
182
U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 180. The median family income in the Ninth
Ward is $21,721, compared to the national median family income of $50,046. Id.
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times as many families lived in poverty than in the nation as a
183
whole. However, despite the dismal economic statistics, a high percentage of Ninth Ward residents are homeowners compared to the
184
national average. Acknowledging that residents of the Ninth Ward
are generally not as wealthy as their state and national counterparts is
not meant to suggest that any federal program that creates incentives
for a state buyout of property triggers the URA if the sellers are of
limited financial means. Rather, this is meant to reinforce the express purpose of the URA to consider the unique circumstances of
185
those affected by federally financed redevelopment efforts.
The theory of “functional takings” is consistent with the purpose
of the URA. It recognizes the reality of the Road Home buyout-only
provision—specifically, that a state buyout is the only rational option
for displaced homeowners of limited financial means. This category
of property transfers to the Road Home cannot be characterized as a
186
voluntary conveyance falling outside the protection of the URA.
As explained above, homeowners will have the opportunity to
187
self-finance the renovation of their homes.
Considering the low
median income, high percentage of homeowners who own their
homes, and the complete and utter devastation of the homes in the
Ninth Ward, this “alternative” will likely be entirely unrealistic for a
188
substantial portion of Ninth Ward residents.
Alternatively, homeowners will have the option to sell their
189
homes on the open market. This option clearly assumes that there
is something left to sell. However, the wall of water that rushed into
the Ninth Ward completely destroyed homes in the immediate vicinity of the levee breach, removed others from their foundations, and

183

Id. Of the families in the Ninth Ward, 34.0% lived below the poverty line in
2000, compared with only 9.2% for the nation as a whole. Id.
184
The Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, Lower Ninth Ward
Neighborhood: Housing & Housing Costs, http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/8/22/
housing.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2007). The Greater New Orleans Community
Data Center reports that as of the year 2000 (most recent data available), fifty-nine
percent of Lower Ninth Ward residents owned and occupied their homes, compared
to 66.2% for the nation as a whole. Id.
185
42 U.S.C. § 4621(c)(2) (2000).
186
See supra notes 103–09 and accompanying text.
187
LRA, ROAD HOME OVERVIEW, supra note 32, at 8.
188
The Census statistics reveal low household wealth, indicating the difficulty
Ninth Ward residents would likely have in financing renovations by using their savings. Moreover, the increase in monthly recurring costs will likely preclude poorer
homeowners from financing the renovation over a long period of time.
189
LRA, ROAD HOME OVERVIEW, supra note 32, at 4.
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submerged everything else in fourteen feet of water.
As a result of
this complete devastation, this subset of homeowners will likely receive nothing more than the value of the land on which their homes
were formerly located if they were to sell on the open market. As
with the self-financing option, the open-market sale “alternative”
hardly presents homeowners with even the semblance of choice. This
distressing reality leads to one ineluctable outcome for affected
homeowners: sell to the state at a pre-storm fair market value. Consequently, certain Road Home acquisitions should properly be considered “functional takings” for purposes of the URA, thereby moving
the property conveyance away from the realm of voluntariness and
triggering URA displacement benefits.
CONCLUSION
Some may argue that compelling URA benefits punishes the
Road Home for its generosity as the program essentially gives qualified residents free retroactive flood insurance. This argument carries
at least superficial appeal. However, a court must examine the practical effect, logical coherence, and statutory framework governing
191
post-disaster redevelopment.
First, if Road Home administrators
ultimately categorize certain neighborhoods as buyout-only, it will be
an express attempt to further the broader public weal to the detriment of those homeowners who would otherwise benefit from the
redevelopment program. Second, widespread displacement was aggravated by the ambiguities created by Road Home administrators.
Specifically, program administrators (1) failed to determine which
neighborhoods, if any, would be affected by the buyout-only restriction, (2) failed to articulate guidelines quickly and clearly so residents
could choose to rebuild or relocate, and (3) failed to promptly distribute grant monies to qualified homeowners.
There is a natural predilection to rebuild what once was, yet difficult and politically unpalatable choices must be made if the realities
facing the Gulf Coast are to be honestly and compassionately con192
The people of New Orleans have suffered tremendously
fronted.
since the summer of 2005, and while the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina, exacerbated by governmental failures at every level,
caused billions of dollars in damage and took the lives of 1500 indi-

190

VAN HEERDEN & BRYAN, supra note 10, at 84.
Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
424–34 (1989).
192
KAHAN ET AL., supra note 23, at xiii.
191
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viduals, reason for optimism remains. Residents, community groups,
and policy makers have a uniquely powerful and dynamic charge—
rebuild a great city. In so doing, three principles must guide the effort: effectiveness, efficiency, and equity.
Effective redevelopment hinges on whether city, state, and federal officials forthrightly confront the confluence of disappearing
wetlands, land subsidence, and an inadequate levee system. Efficient
redevelopment relies on vesting city planners and policy makers with
both the discretion and the leadership to concentrate redevelopment
in order to facilitate the provision of critical infrastructure and city
services. A smaller city, at least in the short term, may be a necessary
evil brought about by the reality of permanent and semi-permanent
displacement, which in turn places severe constraints on city services.
Equally important is that redevelopment efforts be guided by
principles of equity and comply with the uniform federal displacement policy. After Katrina, a smaller New Orleans serves the public
welfare, a reality acknowledged in the Road Home’s buyout-only provision, and the affected residents should not be forced to “suffer dis193
proportionate injuries as a result” of the planned redevelopment.
Moreover, the “choices” the Road Home provides certain homeowners ultimately leads to a single inescapable outcome, thereby removing the critical element of voluntariness from buyout-only acquisitions. Implementing the status-preserving principles embodied in
the URA can potentially transform the Road Home from the single
largest housing recovery program to one that is also effective, efficient, and equitable.
In the end, however, the scope of this Comment is broader than
either Hurricane Katrina or the Road Home. Both are offered and
analyzed here as templates of future disasters and corresponding recovery efforts. It is crucial that government officials, community
groups, practitioners, and the general public understand the scope
and application of the URA. The element of voluntariness embedded within the URA’s statutory and regulatory framework can redefine future post-disaster redevelopment efforts, and provide government officials the flexibility to offer unique and resource-efficient
recovery plans while simultaneously protecting the homeowner status
of displaced residents.

193

42 U.S.C. § 4621(b) (2000).

